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Do Animals Help Resolve Existential Questions?

Abstract.
This research is of a qualitative nature, employing fourteen open unstructured interviews.  Participants were comprised of undergraduate students and non-academics currently symbiosing with domesticated cats and dogs.  The research question is “Do animals help resolve existential questions?”  The research uses the existential writings of Jean-Paul Sartre as a foundation.  The analysis employs the systematic discourse analysis techniques formulated by Potter & Mulkay (1985), and Potter & Wetherell (1989).  The discussion focuses on the linguistic construction of Sartre's concepts of being, and the positioning role of language as used in interpersonal relationships.  The findings from this research indicate that other animals do play an important role in aiding us to resolve existential questions, but we give them little in terms of reciprocal payment for these services.  Therefore, should we be employing other animals in our search for answers to our own personal existential questions at all?  As this is an existentialist piece of research, and also coming from a social constructionist viewpoint, there is an undercurrent of consciousness raising flowing throughout it.
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Introduction.
Human individuals have a long history of symbiosis with other animals.  Our domestic interactions with other animals predates our earliest recorded communications.  Reflecting on this history of symbiosis, we could say that such interactions had, and still continue to have, some significant meaning to those individuals involved in such relationships.  Here the intention is to look at the relationship between humans and other animals within an existential framework, and to focus primarily on the interpersonal relationship itself.  For it could be said that all that we do to other animals is psychological preparation for our own interpersonal relationships.
	One of the peculiar characteristics of human beings (as far as we know) is that we are capable of being conscious of being conscious of ourselves and our environment.  This reflexive consciousness of our self and environment means that we are inundated with a vast and constant array of experience, and that we are also conscious of our place within this ceaseless infinitude.  	The consequences of our reflexivity are that we are now aware of our existential concerns.  For example, we are aware of our finiteness, as we exist for a short period in boundless time and space, which has continued indefinitely before us, and will continue infinitesimally after us (Stevens, 1992).  Also, it is possible for us to question the meaningfulness of our life experience, our values, and our whole existence.  In addition, in that we are capable of imagining realizable alternative courses of action and existences, we have to confront the issue of life as a continuing succession of choices to be made (Stevens, 1996).  
	Human beings come to an awareness of themselves and their environment not just through their individuality, and not just through their differences with others, but in dialogue with other selves, in their presence, and the way others call us into being (Friedman, 1967).  The core of existentialist psychology holds that the individual is free to define life's direction through a continued succession of choices, but this freedom also gives the individual responsibility for the outcomes of those personal decisions, so therefore that freedom may be seen as a source of existential anguish and dread (Brennan, 1994).  
	The object of this research is to discover the basis of the “ideal” relationship.  What are the necessary ingredients for a meaningful relationship between two individuals?  Domesticated cats and dogs were chosen in this research in order to elucidate those metalinguistic elements, that are essential if any deep and meaningful interpersonal relationship is to be successful.  Also this research focuses on how animals are used in the human - animal relationship to resolve our pervasive existential questions, therefore, providing us with feelings of meaning, purpose, control and a definitive concept of self in our world.  The aim here is not to supply an uncritical acceptance of the use of animals in such projects as in “pet therapy”, neither is there any attempt at “comparative psychology”.  The objective is to elucidate in existential terms the basis of the successful interpersonal relationship.  This is accomplished by analysis of the language and metalinguistics employed by human individuals currently engaged in meaningful symbiosis with other animals.  
	Also, because existentialism is concerned with freedom, and because it aims to challenge its readers, to free them from the illusion that is commonly passed off as the legitimate status quo, and to convert them (Warnock, 1970), there is a reflexive undercurrent of consciousness raising, towards the exploitation of other animals by human beings, which flows throughout this research.

Introduction to terminology employed in the research.
The philosophical background for this research stems from the work of the existential - phenomenonalist writer Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980).  The main terminology employed throughout this research is derived from Sartre's (1943/1969) work, “Being and Nothingness”.  As well as being thought of as Sartre's greatest work, it has also come to be regarded as a textbook of existentialism itself (Warnock, 1970).  However, this is not to accept such work uncritically.  The terminology employed by Sartre (1969) in his writing could be called laborious in places, being comprised of hyphenated terms which may not be immediately accessible to the non-academic reader.  Therefore, time has been taken to explain some of the main concepts used in this research.
	Throughout his writing, “Being and Nothingness”, Sartre constructs the individual and her / his interactions with other individuals and the environment as states of being.  A person or object is what they do, or are, at the most fundamental level.  Therefore, it could be said that to a certain extent Sartre adopts the behaviourist approach that an individual is the sum of their actions.  However, for Sartre the individual is far from simply a mechanism responding to stimulus.  Instead of taking a determinist view, the individual is seen as an active agent, engaged in making choices and constructing her / his world through consciousness.  For Sartre the world is essentially devoid of structure and in its proper sense chaos.  If consciousness picks out an object from this background, then this objects differentiation from the undifferentiated background is the work of consciousness.  Consciousness differentiates the object as a handy instrument and negates the background.  It is consciousness then that makes things appear as distinct (McGinn, 1987).  Therefore, it is the individual who actively constructs his / her world through a dynamic consciousness.
	The being of things, being-in-itself (l’ en-soi), is rigid, immobile, deterministic, and already complete in itself.  Devoid of potency and becoming, it simply is.  It is absolutely contingent, wholly given, and without any reason for its being (Warnock, 1970).  It is roughly equivalent to the inert world of objects and things.  Uncreated, without reason for being, without connection to any other being, being-in-itself is superfluous (de trop) for all eternity (McGinn, 1987).  The world simply is, it is in itself, and it is what it is.  It has no ultimate grounds for existence.  It is inexplicable, absurd.  Apart from consciousness, the world is simply gratuitous, opaque, nebulous, undifferentiated being-in-itself (Baldwin, 1995).
	By way of contrast, being-for-oneself (pour soi) is forever incomplete, fluid, vacuous and lacking in determined structure.  It corresponds to the being of human consciousness.  Since everything which is existing must be a thing-in-itself, Sartre concludes that this different type of being can only be not being-in-itself.  It is therefore not being, nothingness (le neant).  It is not.  Thus, the consciousness of a human being, being-for-oneself, consists in nothing (McGinn, 1987).  This can be shown by the human ability to receive negative answers to questions.  Thus, for example, if one discovers that the spare tyre is missing from the car, or that ones friend is not in the restaurant, then one learns how negative realities come into the world through human consciousness (Howells, 1992).  Not-being can appear in this particularized or local form within the world only because human consciousness constitutes itself as not-thing, or as other than its physical environment, its body, its past, and indeed everything in the world about it.  As a result of this “’nothingness“’, we are apt to apprehend small pockets of negativity in the world.  This occurs in the attitude of questioning and is revealed in the experience of lack, which characterises human reality (Howells, 1992).
	In addition to the in-itself and the for-itself, Sartre discloses, by attending to the structures of consciousness, a third category of being, namely being-for-others (pour autrui).  My apprehension of my own being is so structured that it presupposes the existence of other conscious beings (Warnock, 1970).  According to Sartre, consciousness takes on the structure of being-for-others, it becomes an object in the world, when it is subjected to the look (le regard) of the other.  In experiencing the look I can establish a new relation to myself, as in the attitude of shame: I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the other (Warnock, 1970).  The look of the other reduces me to a reified object, a being-in-itself.  I experience my freedom as threatened by another who is about to ingest and absorb me into the orbits of their concerns.  I can defend and reaffirm my freedom, in retaliation, by rendering the other into an object; but the other can stage a similar counter attack, and the cycle simply repeats itself (Howells, 1992).  The fundamental character of interpersonal relations is thus a confrontation between freedoms, which Sartre sees as generating relations of reciprocal conflict.  Thus, the basic modes of human relationship embody self-defeating projects.  Love is the wish to possess the other’s freedom, for the other to be freely enslaved; but this is not possible as the possession self defeatingly implies an exercise of freedom, so the object of love is futile.  Being a being-for-others implies a confrontation with them.  The essence of the relationship with others, then, is conflict.  Each seeks to dominate the other as a free being (Howells, 1992).

Method.
A series of fourteen open unstructured interviews were conducted with the participants, who were comprised of a mixture of undergraduate University students, and non-academic people.  Prerequisite to being interviewed was to be engaged in symbiosis with an animal, for this research, domesticated cats or dogs.  Each interview lasted approximately fifteen minutes to half an hour, and was comprised of eight questions.  Participants were encouraged to diverse from the questions as and when they felt.  Interviews were audio taped with consent and later transcribed verbatim ready for analysis.“’

Analysis.
The interview transcripts were analysed initially for repetitive themes running throughout all fourteen interviews.  Once this had been accomplished, the interviews were again analysed for themes specific to the questions asked.  As the questions themselves form the mainstay of the research, and as they form “natural” breaks, it was decided to use them as the main structure of the analysis.  The questions were asked specifically to elucidate elements of Sartre's (1969) existential writings, and the relationships formed between the individual being and the Other.  Issues that formed the questions involve the concepts of negation, the in-itself, possession of being, reification of being, and assimilation.  The first question was asked to elucidate the nature of the relationship as given by the human participants.  The last question focused on the similarities and differences perceived between humans and other animals.  
	Sartrean concepts were applied to all of the interviews and concordant issues were extracted to form the structure of the analysis text.  Analysis of the extracts were further subjected to a systematic analysis of discourse (Potter & Mulkay, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1989). The notation employed in the analysis emphasises salient points which are explained further in the preceding text.  Thus, this form of analysis takes a position which is neither one of linguistic determination, nor where speakers can make of discourse anything they like (Potter & Reicher, 1986).  Where extensive extracts from the interviews are employed, the aim is to combine several extracts to form a comprehensive statement about a specific topic.  
	The ultimate aim of this in depth analysis is to elucidate Sartrean concepts within the text, while drawing attention to repetitive themes that run through the extracts.  One is thus asked to imagine two different planes running simultaneously, one “vertical”, composed of questions, and the other “lateral” comprised of themes running throughout the interviews and the range of questions.

Q1:	Could you tell me in your own words what your animal means to you?
This question was asked to find out just what, in the most general of terms, the person's animal means to them.  Why do some human beings engage in meaningful symbiosis with other animals (for this research, cats and dogs)?  Elucidated from extracts of the interviews were a number of issues including companionship, verbal company, family substitution, and security.
	The issue of company is centred around the Sartrean concept of being-for-other.  For Sartre it is the Other’s body that is the expression of our being.  Just the same as projection and introjection, we express our selves (and are expressed ourselves) through others.  As in friendship, it is my feeling towards my being that the Other produces that makes me wish to make room in my own project for the Others, so as to shelter or lend assistance to it (Howells, 1992).  As the Other is to me, so I am to the Other, and the ideal interaction with the Other is the communication of the quality of my being (Friedman, 1967). That is, by saying to the Other (whoever that may be), look, this is what comprises me; this is who and what I am.  Animals, as a non-threatening Other, seem to facilitate this ideal communication: “It’s a friend for a start,- “she’s a friend, someone who's there to welcome you home.” - “They're good companionship.  They’re great friends really.”.
Though Sartre does not explicitly say so, it seems he is identifying conscious beings with language using beings.  It is the ability to formulate categories which constitutes being-for-itself.  As animals are not overt language users, they are not considered to be fully being-for-itself, but rather being-in-itself (Warnock, 1970).  The Other which is being-for-itself has the power to interfere with my projects.  I may wish to engage in a certain action, but I am always aware that someone else may come along and intrude upon what I am doing.  The Other is the hidden death of my possibilities (Sartre, 1969). This means that we can safely engage in linguistic relationships with animals without the fear of censure from the Other.  This is revealed through extracts from the interviews: “You talk to the dog [3], it’s like a conversation,” – “he's someone [2] to talk to [1] as well, when you’re alone.  You find yourself talking to them [3] just because it’s someone [2] to talk to [1].” – “if I'm having a hard time over something I can always go and whinge at the cat [3] over it.”  Here we see verbal relationships between individuals and animals [1], and although the animal is primarily treated as a being in its own right [2], there exists an attitude of detachment and reification towards the animal [3].
	We can see the same techniques employed through the issue of family substitution: “it's [1] a part of the family.” – “it’s [1] like [2] a part of the family really,” – “he’s just like an extension [3] of the family.” – “he more or less [4] gets treated like a child.”. Through these extracts we see that the animal is still subject to reification [1].  The animal is only “like” [2] a member of the family, not “is” a member of the family, and the animal is an “extension” [3] of the family.  Also, that they are treated “more or less” [4] like a child, and not “as” a child.  
	Through the issue of security we find the same kind of techniques employed again: “she’s a friend and protector.” [1] “She just lets you know there’s someone out there.” [1] “They’re very good for security [3].  They’re better than any burglar alarm [3], you know things are going to be safe when you’re not there.” [2] - ”Home security, a deterrent for burglars.” [3]. Here we find the animal starting out as companion and guardians [1], providing an important service [2], before being reduced to a thing-in-itself [3].  These extracts could be explained in terms of the animal initially starting out as a being in its own right, before becoming a being-for-our-being, and then ultimately becoming a being-in-itself / thing-in-itself, which assures the existential security of our being-for-itself-for-Other.

Q2:	Would you say that your animal provides you with some missing element in your life?
This question is concerned with the concept of negation, what is it that is missing from the person’s life, that is made present by the existence of the animal.  In existential terms, the person is required to bring to the fore that which is negated in life through consciousness, but held from actual negation by the existence of the animal.  For example, one of the issues raised is companionship: “it’s companionship,” – “companionship if anything at all,” – “They're good company.”. To be specifically conscious of company automatically implies the negation of solitude.  One is to be replaced by the other, both being different sides of the same coin.  Consciousness of companionship is therefore employed to nihlate consciousness of solitude, but existentially the attempt is futile as the concept of solitude persists through negation.  
	This condition is explained by Sartre (1969) as our being-for-other.  “The Other whom I wish to assimilate is by no means the Other-as-object.”. - for if I were to subject the Other to reification, then any companionship gained from the other would cease to be, therefore, “I want to assimilate the Other as the Other-looking-at-me, and this project of assimilation includes an augmented recognition of my being-looked-at.” (Sartre, 1969).  Therefore, the presence of the Other, companionship, gives meaning to my existence by my being-for-other.  I am now the in-itself which exists for-itself which exists for-other.  
	One other issue that was made evident through the question of negation [1] was animals being used as a child substitution [2]: “He’s like another child [2], a part of the family,” – “now the children have left home - they fill that gap [1].  They are just like children [2].”.   This act of using the animal as a child substitution seems to be inextricably linked to the previous issue of companionship.  For example: “In only having one child I still have the mothering instinct [2]. - I think he needs me, and he’s totally dependent on me [1].  So I think he fills that need [2], the fact that you need to feel wanted and needed,” – “He’s like another child, a part of the family [1], - you love him like part of the family, care for him.  Really its another thing to care for isn’t he [1].” – “Our children have left home now, so yes they fill that gap [2]. They are just like children, they need love and looking after just the same [1].”.  
Again we see the concepts of being-for-other [1], and negation [2] emerging from these quotes.  As far as child substitution is concerned, we could probably say that the individual becomes not just being-for-other, but as Mead(1934) might put it, being-for-significant-other, the child holding an important, significant, place within the individuals consciousness.  This project of being-for-significant-other therefore gives my being a definite purpose for existence.
	However, this raises some fundamental questions about why people have children, especially when the child is part of a planned conception.  One could postulate that we do not initially have children because we “love” them.  Before the child exists there is only nothingness, filled by the personal desire for a child.  “Love”, then, for the specific child cannot exist, as the specific child does not yet physically exist.  Having children (planned conception especially) may therefore be seen as an attempt to fill the gap of a “nothingness” in consciousness, which is manifested through the desire for the company of a significant Other.  Having children may be seen objectively as a “selfish” act.  Furthermore, the child serves to reaffirm our being; as the child has come from me, I must therefore exist, - “procrearé ergo sum”.  However, all we can ever accomplish is a replication of the very nothingness that lies at the core of our being.  We create a being to reaffirm our own being, however, just like Frankenstein, the created being is just as devoid of meaning and purpose as its creator, having the same existential nothingness at its centre.  Even our acts of procreation result in nothingness - nothingness prevails.  

Q3:	Would you say that your animal helps you give purpose to a seemingly nonsensical world?
How do animals help us give purpose and meaning to a world that may seem to be chaotic, accidental, and at times totally absurd, that is existentially, in-itself.  	One of the horrifying features of reality, as it revealed itself to the character Roquentin in the park in Nausea (Sartre, 1965), was that being, actual concrete existence, could not wholly be contained in the ordinary categories of language.  “It flowed out at the edges of our categories in a messy and threatening way.” (Sartre, 1965).  Human beings are prone to want material objects to be completely predictable and completely under their control (Warnock, 1970).  Therefore, given that the world is naturally in-itself, one of the main reasons we exploit other animals is to give us an illusion of control over this in-itself element.  
	One of the main issues elucidated from this question is how other animals aid in providing temporal structure for our constructed being: “you have to be there for the animal.” – “you have to exercise them and you do these things automatically - they know the time of day - when they want to get up - when they want to go out - and they give us purpose through these things.” – “he has his own kind of routine.  So despite everything, I still have to make sure he gets fed - so he provides an element of stability in the house.” – “they help put that routine back in your life - the dog’s routine of wanting to be fed and walked helps structure our lives.”. This desire for order may be seen as an attempt to gain an element of control over the unpredictable, unknowable future.  For Sartre (1969), that which is future is a nothingness.  “It is not in-itself, and neither is it in the mode of being of the for-itself since it is the meaning of the for-itself. The future is not, it is possibilized.”.  Therefore, by employing the animal, we use routines as an existential shield against the chaos of the unknown, the future.  Because we have always fed the dog at five o'clock, we can therefore project a comforting element of stability into the future through intentions and goals, - come five o'clock I will feed the dog (future intention).  However, this is an illusory situation as we can never concretely know the future, all we can do is make provisional plans which are eternally subject to change.  
	The other main issue raised from the question “Do other animals help give purpose to a seemingly nonsensical world”, was that of unconditional acceptance: “the pet’s are always there in a non judgmental way.” – “it’s just having someone there with you, a bit of uncritical moral support.”.
The existential motivation behind this may be that we desire the company of the Other, as something to reaffirm our existence, but now we have found an Other who appears not so existentially threatening.  Even in the most understanding and harmonious of human relationships there exists the Other, each being Other-in-conflict to each other.  However, by employing the animal in such relationships we reduce the risk of reification to a minimum.  We receive recognition and acceptance without paying the price of conflict.  
	Furthermore, there is the important point, that the animal is positioned in this role for us through linguistic entrapment: “you can forget about all the bad things that are happening [1], - She isn’t going to remind you of something that’s hurt you [2], - She’s like an island you can go to and forget everything [1], - you know she isn’t going to turn you away or say she hasn’t got time for you [2].” – “[pet's help by] taking [our] attention away from problems [we] may be having [1], - it's nice to have someone there to talk to,”[2]. From this we see concepts of denial and escapism [1], and linguistic exploitation [2], as the animal can’t “remind us” of “bad things”, nor can they “say” that they “haven’t got time for us”, as both “reminding” and “saying” are linguistic practices the animal does not possess.  The honest stand point would be only to say that: “[The animal] can sympathise with you because you feel [the animal] can sympathise with you. - [They] don’t judge you, or confuse you, [they] just sit there and meow.”, or woof. Anything other than this is an act of bad faith, as we are deceiving ourselves that we can either escape the reality of “bad things”, or that we are entering in to a reciprocal, verbally linguistic, conversation with the animal.  One important point was made which summarizes the question and our existential condition fully: “I often wonder about the life we lead, and the life an animal leads. - They seem more in touch with the real world [in-itself]. – It’s us [being-for-itself-for-other] that makes the world nonsensical if it is at all.”. That is, through the choices each one of us makes, we construct the world between us, and sometimes it could be said that we do not construct the world to our or the Other’s best advantage.

Q4:	Do you think people have animal relationships because they appear less possessive than human relationships?
According to Sartre, personal relationships emerge out of a desire to possess the other’s freedom.  Not that the other should be compulsory enslaved as in Hegel's Master / Slave relationship (Hegel, 1884/1949), but for the other to be freely enslaved, which is in fact impossibility.  Furthermore, in order to maintain before me the other’s freedom which is looking at me, I identify myself totally with my being-looked-at.  And since my being-as-object is the only possible relationship between me and the other, it is this being-as-object which alone can serve me as an instrument to effect my assimilation of the other’s freedom (Sartre, 1969).  While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me.  Descriptions of concrete behaviour in relationships must be seen as within the perspective of conflict (Howells, 1992).
	The issue raised here through the interviews was the unconditionality of animal relationships:
“it’s a responsive love that’s undemanding.” – “They’re unconditional relationships, - there are no conditions attached to it,” – “I suppose animals give whatever.  Whereas with human’s there's always a restriction on something. - animals give unconditionally.” – “I don’t think animals are as possessive as people.  That doesn’t mean the animal doesn’t love you, but it’s like a non-possessive love.” – “it’s a more simple relationship than a human relationship, that’s what makes it easier for some people.” – “She doesn’t really put any conditions on me, and she allows me to be me. - If you really love somebody, you’ll allow them their freedom, which doesn’t always happen in human relationships.”.
From this wealth of information we see that one of the main characteristics of the human - animal relationship is that existential conflict is brought to a minimum.  That is, by entering into a relationship with the animal, we can retain a measure of our being-for-itself.  Here we are able to be being-for-oneself - being-for-Other without the threat of reification, we can reify the animal, but as the animal is something of a passive recipient of our reification, the reciprocal threat is diminished.
	Further aspects of the human - animal relationship are shown centring around the being-for-other [1], and the reification [2], and possession of the Other’s freedom [3], that is the animal’s freedom, not the being-for-other’s: “I think it’s [2] something [2] to love [1],” – “they rely on us for their basic amenities [3],” – “I’m more possessive with the dog [2] [3] because it’s a dumb animal [2], - more possessive in that you have to look after it [2] [3],” – “All they want is to be taken out for walks [3].” – “it’s just routine with a pet [2][4], not possessive [4].”. Here we see humans as being-for-Other, but this being-for-Other is a possessive, reifying practice.  We see how initially the aim is one of looking after, and caring for the animal [1], but this action is inextricably linked to the acts of reification [2], and possession [3].  Analysis of the vocabulary used to describe the animals elucidates this: “I think [it’s something] to love,” – “[it’s] a [dumb] animal, - you have to look after [it].” – “it’s just routine with a [pet].”.  
Finally we see an act of bad faith through the denial / rationalization [4] of this reificatory practice.
	In order to place these events into their proper context in Sartrean philosophy, it is worth noting here the motives underlying the above actions.  The fundamental object of the relationship is possession of the Other’s freedom, but not that this should be obtained under overt duress, or domination.  	Sartre (1969) makes the relevant point that if Tristan and Isold only fell in love because of a love potion, then that love would be worthless.  Our aim is to possess the Other’s freedom as a freedom.  For the Other to be completely besotted with us, for us to be the pivot of the Other’s universe.  What we ultimately request is that we become the Other’s freedom, but this automatically limits and effectively annihilates the very freedom we wish to procure.  Therefore, tragically, the whole process is doomed to failure.  The more we attempt to obtain this elusive freedom, the more it evades us; and the more we end up reducing the Other into an object.  Thus, the concept of the domination of the Other’s freedom should be understood in terms of an unending conflict, which through its very nature results in reification, domination, and assimilation.  Therefore, the focus then must subtly fluctuate between conscious, and subconscious intentions of the above actions.

Q5:	Would you say that people have animal relationships because they appear less reificatory than human relationships?  (Do you think your animal sees you more as a “person” rather than “an object”?) 
The primary concern of this question is reification.  According to Sartre (1969), the look of the Other reduces the person being looked at to that of a thing.  “The Other looks at me, and as such he holds the secret of my being, he knows what I am.  Thus the profound meaning of my being is outside me, imprisoned in an absence.”  One’s being is wholly dependent on reflection from the Other.  “The Other steals my being from me, and I recover myself only through absorbing him.  Nonetheless, I exist by means of the Other’s freedom: for I need his freedom as a reflection through which I am aware of myself.  Therefore, I have no security in making him into an object, but I must try instead to get hold of his freedom and reduce it to being a freedom subject to my freedom.” (Sartre, 1969).  This process is the basis of the Other’s stance towards my being, therefore, our interpersonal relationships are reduced to something of a paradoxical series of conflicts, revolving around my reification of the Other and the Other’s reification of myself.
	From the interviews we find the re-occurring theme of unconditional acceptance, a theme that seems to epitomize the motivating force behind why human beings engage in meaningful symbiosis with other animals.  “It doesn’t matter what you are to them [1]. - They are quite happy to live with you, as you are [2].” – “If animals saw us as just things they wouldn’t show the affection they do towards us [3].” – “They definitely show affection, - and showing affection means that they see you as a person [4].”.  From these extracts we see that it doesn’t matter what we are to the animal [1].  That is, even if we are not-thing, even if we are possessive Other.  Also, we see how the animal provides us with the freedom to construct our being [2], “they are happy to live with us as we are”, or rather, as we construct ourselves in our freedom.  We further engage in a rationalization [3], and reaffirmation [4] of our being not-thing.  
	This rationalization is backed by the receiving of affection from the animal.  We are now endowed with meaning by the animal, we have successfully become the centre of the animal’s universe.  The possessive-Other has total domination over the passive-Other, who allows us to dominate its freedom.  However, as Sartre (1969) states, this allowance of domination is itself an act of freedom, so we have been duped through the animal’s passivity and our own acts of bad faith.  The last statement summarizes the nature of this unrealisable relationship: “Your [4] pet [5] loves [2] you [3] warts and all [1].” The animal is seen as giving unconditional [1] “warts and all” acceptance [2] “love”, towards a specific being [3] “you”, but in return the animal is subjected to possession and reification [4] “Your” [possessive] [5] “pet” [thing].  However, a thing [5] cannot exercise freedom, which is what the animal is doing here, so therefore the practices of reification and possession [4] [5] are illusory.  
	Furthermore, the animal could be seen as ultimately evading our attempts at domination by ever submitting, therefore slipping through our fingers like water.  As long as the animal consents to our demands it will always be free, and in any relationship our attempts at domination will be illusory and futile.  The only way the animal’s freedom can be dominated is if the animal fights back, which is then a true conflict of freedoms.  We find this in human terms within the boxing ring, and for other’s, in cases of overt animal cruelty.  To ensure complete domination we would have to physically constrain the animal (as in the zoo or circus scenario), but as soon as the animal surrenders and accepts this bondage the conflict is over; again our projects are rendered futile.

Q6:	Do you think people project elements of themselves onto their animals?
This question is concerned with how we employ animals to aid the construction of our own being.  As we have at our heart a nothingness, we therefore need some external form of object with which to verify our constructed being.  By projecting elements of that which we see as “our self” on to the animal, we can therefore stand back and say, “This animal has X qualities which belong to my being.”, and through viewing these qualities, we construct a being, via proxy, in the face of our nothingness.  The animal has certain qualities which facilitate this process of constructing-a-being.  For example, the animal cannot answer us back, therefore our constructed being cannot be questioned or denied.  The purpose of the animal then is to materially and linguistically reaffirm our being against the background of our existential nothingness.  The animal is therefore effectively assimilated into our being. 
	Extracts from the interviews carried out during this research revealed further confirmation of Sartre's (1969) concepts of domination, reification, assimilation, and reaffirmation of being: “a pet [1] is different to a human being in that you can implement your ways and ideas [2], as they haven’t got a mind of their own [1] - so all your idiosyncrasies can be played out on an animal [2].”. Here we see that the animal is turned into a mindless inanimate object [1] initially, before being assimilated [2] by the process of psychical domination.  This process of psychical domination serves to affirm our personal theories of independent being.  “We have observed that the Other’s freedom is the foundation of my being.  But precisely because I exist by means of the Other’s freedom, I have no security.” (Sartre, 1969).  In order to regain my security I am therefore forced to reassert my own freedom over the Other.  One way to accomplish this task is to assimilate the Other into my concerns.  For example: “We have two dogs [1], we seem to have our own [1] which we relate to more [2].  We both see elements of ourselves [2] in our dog [1], and both see elements of each other [3] in the other dog.”. In this extract we see the processes of possession [1], assimilation [2], and a discrimination of that which is considered self, and not-self [3].  Further examples of this can be seen: “if [the animal] does something nice then she’s like me [1] [3], if [the animal] does something that isn’t nice then it’s [4] like someone else [2].”. Here we see the distinction of self [1], which also includes the constructed-self [3] “my being has X qualities”, and that which is considered not-self [2].  Also, that which is considered to be not-self is reduced to object [4].  Both of these examples involve the person engaging in acts of bad faith, as there is a selective process of rejection of qualities that belong to the individual; nobody does only nice things.  
	Honest projection is where the individual openly accepts that certain qualities are being attributed to the animal (or other individual).  For example: “I see my cat as being independent, my cat is just being a cat, but because I like the idea of independence the cat has this quality.”.
Again: “people have animals as status symbols [1], but at the end of the day the animal isn’t brought any closer to its owner [2].  I think this puts a barrier between the animal and its owner [2] when this happens, because the pet [2] is just a thing [1] then.”. Here we can see how animals are consciously recognised as being subject to reification [1], but also how this practice continues subconsciously [2].  So we can see that we employ the freedom given by other animals as a means to construct our being through projection and introjection, and how we guard our constructed being against the Other through the use of assimilation and reification.

Q7:	Do you think your animal helps you get closer to nature?
The aim of this question is to find out if symbiosis with other animals (mainly cats and dogs) brings us closer in any way to our existential roots, that is, the being-in-itself - being-for-itself.  One way that animals seem to make us more aware of our existential condition is through death, which is the condition we fear most; the unknowable infinity of nothingness: “When the cat has killed a bird or mouse, or when you see it killing something, you have to remind yourself that this is nature.” – “when he brings frogs into the house, and when he chases squirrels, but these are all natural things though.”. It could be said that we, as human beings, seem to forget that death is as much a part of life as being born.  Indeed, death may be seen by some as one of the greatest adventures that we have to face up to in life.  Rather than just merely forgetting, it could be said that we exist in a denial of our own death.  Death for the existential individual means the ultimate obliteration and nothingness of being.  Our being is not just reduced to an object or thing-in-itself, it is totally annihilated.  The ultimate not-being.
	One other important issue raised here is how the individual attempts to distance their being from the in-itself natural world.  Apart from actually venturing out into the in-itself domain whilst exercising the animals, which seems to have some beneficial results, “you’re out and about more, you’re healthier in your mind and body.”.  It could be said that, as civilised beings, we seem content to experience the in-itself through the bad-faith of television.  “it brings us closer to nature just watching animals on the television,” – “We seem to watch more natural things on T.V., the wildlife programmes and things,”. Through the medium of television we can come as close as we dare to the in-itself, knowing that if the rawity of it all gets too much, we can always turn to the security (bad-faith) of a more civilised channel.  Therefore, we could say that symbiosis with other animals brings us closer to the natural in-itself, but we distance ourselves from this entity by employing various conscious and subconscious distractions.

Q8:	What do you think the main differences are between animals and people?
In this question the aim is to find out how people position themselves in relation to other animals.  That is, how we relate ourselves, being-for-itself - being-for-others, to the in-itself.  Do we ever consider ourselves to be animals (which biologically we are), and do animals ever enter the cherished circle to become people?  One of the most obvious differences between animals and people (human beings) was made that: “People don’t wear fur coats unless they buy them.”.  This point highlights the crux of one of our main existential dilemmas.  That the body is the in-itself  - the body is a thing.  However, it is the pure, solid, in-itself that the individual finds so nauseating.  The human obsessions of clothing and cosmetics could be seen as attempts to conceal and manipulate the in-itself within us, and to create a being for ourselves under the gaze of the Other.  However, the in-itself persists, enveloping our nothingness within its core.
	Further extracts reveal additional differences between human beings and other animals as disclosed through the interviews: “We are thinking, reasoning beings [1], they don’t reason [2], - they go more by instinct [2] than reason [1].” – “The main difference is one of brain power,” [1].  Here we see a distinction being made of other animals as in-itself [2], and human beings as being-for-itself [1].  The in-itself [2] is seen as non-conscious ‘Cartesian entities, responding only to environmental stimulus or unconscious “drives”.  The being-for-itself [1] is a conscious being, aware of itself and its condition, and able to form projects for itself.  
	The making of projects for the being-for-itself-for-other allows us to skate across the surface of our existence, taking these plans and projects seriously, believing these are things we “have got to do” (Warnock, 1970).  As long as we take these concerns seriously we can distract ourselves from the absurdity of our nothingness, and the freedom to which we are condemned.  However, being aware of our existential condition, and the awareness of the pervasive in-itself, results in what Sartre describes as a feeling of nausea.  This nausea is fundamentally the result of the backdrop from which our perceptions are differentiated, the thought of the frightful teeming unmanageable mass of material of which the world is made (Warnock, 1970).
	Sartre (1963) describes this nausea through the character Roquentin.  Roquentin is aware that his body “lives all by itself, once it has started.”, and that he continues this through thinking.  However, Roquentin finds that he can do nothing but think, “If only I could prevent myself from thinking.”.  Thus, we are condemned to exist in our world, and have no choice but to make choices in our lives, against the backdrop of our awareness of our existential condition.  This nausea is revealed in the interviews as people compare differences in lifestyles between human people and other animals:
“there is a great difference in how we live, where we work for a living, and have to buy clothes to cover ourselves with, and have to live in houses [1].” – “people have a lot more to do in their lives, like get up for work, money worries [1]. - Animals don't worry about anything [2]. - people need animals more than animals need people [3].  Animals could survive without people [4].” – “[animals] have much simpler lives, they do whatever they want whenever they want [2], they don’t have to worry about any major problems in life.”. Here we see a selection of projects that we engage in [1].  However, these projects result in more projects being constructed, which eventually escalates into a form of self-feeding circle.  Further we see that, as part of the in-itself, animals seem to be unconstrained by such constructed projects [2].  Also we see that people, unlike animals, require the presence of the Other to sustain their being [3).  Additionally, animals, as part of the in-itself, are wholly independent of human beings for their existence [4]. This is a fundamental element of the nausea we experience, as we, as human beings, are no longer the centre and meaning for the universe, we are insignificant and finitely temporal.
	One consequence of engaging in our constructed projects is that we are now able to transcend our being-for-self-for-other, into a being-for-material-objects.  This is where we direct our whole consciousness towards material possessions.  By directing our consciousness towards objects, we existentially in effect become that object, our being is constructed through a reflective consciousness of objects and Other’s (Howells, 1992).  For Sartre (1969), reflective consciousness is being conscious of being conscious of a certain object.  As consciousness is fixated onto a certain object, consciousness becomes, in affect, that object.  However, consciousness itself is a nothingness, it is not physically any thing, but it is dependent on the physical being for its “existence”.  Therefore, we could say that in our attempt to avoid becoming being-in-itself we have, by constructing our being through material objects, become that which we feared most, the in-itself.
	 This issue is elucidated through an extract from the interviews: “people are more materialistic [1], by collecting possessions which have no sort of direct use [2], or by trying to collect as much as they can [3], even if there’s so much they’ll never end up using it [3]. - Animals seem to take just what they need [4], - People seem to have a thing about meaningless hoarding [3], and worrying that someone else has got more than they have [5].”.  In this extract we can see that our being is dependent on external objects [1] for its construction and perpetuation, and for these purposes we engage in various projects which have no immediate physical application [2].  For example, aesthetic objects may have no immediate biological importance [2], but they aid in the construction of our being, “these are objects which confirm the qualities of my specific being”.  The more objects we have to affirm our being [3], then the more we move away from not-being.  All these activities are carried out under the gaze of the Other [5], and possession of property (including knowledge as property) may be seen to be linked directly to freedom.  Thus, the more possessions (and knowledge) a being has, the more freedom that being has in relation to Others.  Animals, as part of the in-itself, are seen here as not needing the extensive support we seem to give to our being [4], and as such, are quite probably not subject to the nausea which we experience.
	One other issue elucidated through extracts was the presence of a non-threatening-Other that animals seem to provide: “[animals] don’t use you do they, not like a person would.  A person would try and do you out of anything, but animals don't.” – “animals don’t have the nastiness in them that human's have - animals are not so hurtful, where people can be just for spite sometimes.” – “An animal wouldn’t go and do something it knew would hurt you, which is spite, and animals are not spiteful, people are.”.  This issue is one that seems to run through the majority of questions asked.  The presence of an existentially non-threatening, unconditional, willing Other seems to be the motive of symbiosis with animals.  Other issues raised from the question of differences between other animals and humans seem to confirm this:  “Animals give unconditional love, animals are always there for you [2], without any conditions set [1].  She loves me for who I am, failings and all, it doesn't matter [1].” – “at the end of the day you have a pet [3] waiting for you [2], you have this creature who isn’t going to give you any more stress [4].” – “you have something [3] that unquestionably [1] relies on you [5], whatever you do, it will still be there for you [5].”.  From these extracts we see that unconditional acceptance [1] seems to be an important issue.  This could be explained in existential terms as the animal being an Other-for-self [2], as we now have an Other that seems to take us as the centre of its universe [5]. A freedom that is freely given [5]. However, this Other-for-self is still subjected to reification [3] in spite of being a non-threatening-Other-for-self [4].
	Apart from the simple presence of a non-threatening-Other-for-self, animals seem able to facilitate a variation of catharsis: “People talk, [animals] just listen.” – “you can talk to the animal and not get a reply, sort of confide in the animal or answer your own questions, you can’t do that with a human. - it can be a real downer when you haven’t got anything with you, to talk to, or just be with.” – “you can tell them all of you problems.  You don’t have to listen to theirs in return, - they will sit there and just listen to you.” – “animals can sometimes give more companionship than humans,” – “I don’t think animals would take you for granted would they,”.
Other issues raised here were again centred around the death of significant Others: “if you lose someone in the family [2], you have a tendency to let the pet [1] take its place, or let them give some company that has been lost [2] in the individual.” – “pets [1] teach us about dying, - when a pet [1] dies, this prepares children for the death of a loved one in the family. – it’s almost as if [3] they are a member of the family properly.”.  From these extracts we see how animals are employed in filling a negation [2] in our being.  Although the animal fills the negation of a family member, it does not attain the status of a bona fide member, remaining only “as if” [3] through reification [1].
	However, although it seems from this research that animals do help in resolving existential questions, it could be said that this relationship is hardly reciprocal:  “It’s not something you think about much is it.” – “only when you stop and think about it that you realise that they are there for you al the time.” – “they are just something that’s always there for us,”.  One could ask how much longer animals are going to be with us, given the way we repay them for the valuable existential service they provide us with.

Discussion.
From the in depth analysis of questions and repetitive themes we find that other animals do seem to play a definite role in resolving certain individuals existential questions.  How this is accomplished is through the provision of meaning and structure in those individuals lives.  Also, other animals may provide an element of unconditional acceptance in the symbiotic relationship.  This issue of unconditional acceptance is seen by many researchers to be one of the main components in interpersonal relationships, especially in a therapeutic context where the individual's existential questions are brought to the fore (Luborsky, Woody, McLellan, O'Brien, and Rosenweig. 1982; Rogers, 1957; Rogers, Glendlin, Keisler, and Truax, 1967; and Shapiro, 1976).  
	  One could ask, to what extent do Sartre's concepts match with “reality”.  Are the concepts of the in-itself, for-itself, for-others, descriptive of actual concrete modes of being?  For example, if this research were replicated from a psychoanalytic or cognitivist viewpoint, would those researchers then find their own concepts arising from that research?  Have we, in this research, only constructed what we were looking for?  The answer might be that this is only “’one“’ way of seeing the human / other symbiotic relationship.  However, one should always be aware of how close any proposed “model” fits with “reality” as observed.  Existentialism does seem to correlate extremely well with many of the questions and answers that we all posit, about our own, and the Others, existence.  Also, existentialism holds that any data collated must remain within the original context.  It is the individual’s perceptions that are held paramount.  Any attempt at “normality” between individuals here may either correlate well to form definite patterns, or may just as well turn to unpredictable chaos; either way there will be deep meaning and significance involved, attributable to those individuals concerned. 
	Furthermore, it could be said that such concepts are little more than extended rhetoric.  Sartre (1969) himself implies that the main characteristic of being-for-self and its relation to others is the use of linguistic devices.  It is through language that we solidify the world, through rhetoric and metaphor, we shape and construct the psychological realm.  The results of all practical work must be communicated through verbal and written argument; therefore the performance of persuasive acts will always form a part of the activities of science (Myerson, 1994).  Even if the authority of science is directly taken as a result of having communed with nature, the results of that meeting have to be made intelligible and persuasive for others; the distance between philosophy and science therefore is not that great (Soyland, 1994).
	One could also ask if individuals really experience the existential nausea described by Sartre (1965), and if so, is this feeling generated by our existential awareness of the pervasive natural environment, or because of our existential awareness of the social environment into which we are all trapped.  In Nausea, Sartre (1965) gives the impression that it is the natural environment that threatens to overwhelm the individual, but there is increasing evidence that it is the expanding social environment that is the origin of existential anxiety (Castells, 1977., Harrison, 1983., Goodin, 1992.,  Harvey, 1985, and Riis, 1957).  Furthermore, evidence for existentialism in practical settings such as interpersonal relationships has been found by many eminent researchers (Fromm, 1989., Laing, 1969., Mead, 1934., May, 1958., Rogers, 1951., and Yallom, 1980).  
	One aspect of this research is that it elucidates how interpersonal relationships are dependent upon the interactions between individuals (even humans and other animals), and not something which resides “within” people.  This is consistent with the social constructionist view of individuals as language users.  Language is seen as creating “realities”, and positioning individuals (and other animals) into certain roles.  For example, the demands of the role of “mother” are very different from those of the role of “committee member”.  Our behaviour will vary depending upon the role we are currently being positioned in (Burr, 1995).  
	Granted that the animal cannot fully engage in linguistic conversation with us, but through our verbal interactions animals (or any specific Other) are positioned into roles and categories.  It is the character of these conversationally developed relations, and the events occurring within them, that are coming to be seen as of much greater importance than the shared ideas to which they might (or might not) give rise.  For it is from within the dynamically sustained context of these constructed relations that what (and who) is talked about gets its meaning.  Thus, instead of focusing immediately on how individuals come to know the objects and entities in the world around them, we are becoming more interested in how people first develop and sustain certain “’ways“’ of relating themselves to each other in their talk, and then, from within these ways of talking, make sense of their surroundings (Shotter, 1993).  Therefore, the implications of this research may be of importance in raising our level of awareness in how we relate to each other in general.  One may engage in something of a gestalt switch when reading this research, in order to replace the animal / human relationship with the human / human relationship, therefore, reaching to the core of what makes for a working relationship between two sentient, emotional beings.
	We have seen in this research how other animals (humans included) serve a definite role in resolving existential questions from a Sartrean framework.  Also, how our interpersonal relationships are dependent upon our use of language, and how we position each other (other animals included) into certain roles.  The task now is to begin to resolve our own existential questions ourselves, without relying on other individuals for our own answers.  Existentialism has it that it is the individual’s own responsibility to make choices, and to accept the consequences of those choices.  To allow others to make our choices for us is to live in bad faith (Sartre, 1969).  For the existential individual, choices equal empowerment, not just for that individual, but for the Other also.  To do this one might say that we need to recognise that we are all part of an interrelated and extended environment.  Although we are part of an extended network, we must realize that any coherent meaning for our lives comes from within the shared ideas we construct between each other.  Given that we are all Other to each other, we should recognize that we all have that Other within our own being to some extent, and that the categories which segregate us all from each other are constructed linguistically, and therefore, are subsequently open to change if we so wish.
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